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What is a universal welfare state? 
 
The large body of welfare state research that exists has to quite some extent been a taxonomic 
enterprise. Scholars in this field have put at lot of effort into constructing an adequate 
conceptual map that captures the extensive variation that exists in how different industrialized 
Western states are doing “welfare” and what differentiates the one social program from the 
other (Flora, 1987; Swank, 1988; Goul Andersen and Hoff, 1996; Korpi and Palme, 1998; 
Rothstein, 1998; Kuhnle, 2000). Many scholars have come to single out the four Nordic 
countries as a special type of welfare state that has been labelled as “the universal welfare 
state” (Esping-Andersen, 1990). By this is meant that there is a broad range of social services 
and benefits that are intended to cover the entire population throughout the different stages of 
life, and that the benefits are delivered on the basis of uniform rules for eligibility. A typical 
example would be universal childcare or universal child allowances that are distributed 
without any form of means-testing (that is., no individual screening is carried out) Universal 
health care or sickness insurances are other examples. This type of welfare policy may be 
distinguished from selective welfare programs that are intended to assist only those who 
cannot manage economically on their own hand. In a selective program, the specific needs 
and the economic situation of each person seeking assistance have to be scrutinized by some 
administrative process (Kumlin, 2004). A third type of welfare state is that which benefits and 
services are distributed according to status group. In such systems, privileged groups of the 
population are singled out to receive more than the rest of society, a benefit originally 
intended as an award for loyalty to the state.  The status-oriented compartmentalized social 
insurance schemes in Germany, which are tailored to its specific clientele, are a case in point 
(Rothstein and Stolle, 2003) 
It should be noted that all modern welfare states are mixes and that differences 
between various programs can be rather fine-grained. It is also the case that selectivity is 
carried out in a number of different ways. For example, there are programs that caters to 
almost the whole population except for the very wealthy and that are thus not singling out the 
poorest part of the population. Other welfare states have different programs for very broad 
categories of citizens based, for example, on occupational status (Mau, 2003). Nevertheless, 
most welfare state and social policy researchers seem to have accepted the idea that it is 
reasonable to categorize different welfare states according to this universal-selectivity 
 dimension based on what is their typical “modus operandi”(Goodin et al., 1999; Scharpf, 
2000; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Pontusson, 2005).  
A number of important political and social consequences follow from how welfare 
states are organized. First, since universal welfare states cater to a very large part of the 
population, the middle and professional classes are included in the programs. This has 
important electoral and political consequences because the welfare states in the Nordic 
countries are not primarily seen as only catering to the needs of “the poor” (Rothstein and 
Uslaner, 2005). Secondly, a universal welfare system demands a high level of taxation for the 
simple reason that if (almost) everyone is included, the public coffers have to be big (Steinmo, 
1993). Thirdly, a universal policy can be implemented without the large bureaucratic 
apparatus that is needed for carrying out the individualized means-testing that is needed in a 
selective welfare system (Rothstein, 1998). Fourthly, it is well-known that means-testing 
often is perceived by clients as problematic from an integrity perspective and that social 
stigma often follows from being seen as a client in a selective program (Soss, 2000).  
One way to illustrate the differences is to compare a person with low economic 
resources in these different systems, for example a single-parent with low education (usually a 
woman). In a selective system, this is usually a person that does not work because she cannot 
afford daycare. It follows that she and her children have to exist on some form of selective 
benefits which in addition to the integrity problems that follow from means-testing usually 
also carries a social stigma. This is thus a person that can be seen as someone who does not 
contribute to society (not working and not paying taxes) but that survives on special benefits. 
In a universal system, this is usually a person that works because her children are in the public 
childcare or pre-school system as (almost) everyone else’s children. The implication is that 
this is a person that is usually able to get by without applying for social assistance by 
combining her (low) income with the universal benefits and services that goes to everyone. 
She is thus not seen as someone just benefiting from the welfare state and as being outside the 
social fabric (Sainsbury, 1999). Moreover, the services and benefits that she gets do not carry 
any special social stigma and her integrity is not violated by a bureaucratic process 
scrutinizing her economic and social situation.1 
Admittedly, this is an ideal-type of reasoning and one should be vary of the great 
variation that exists between “really existing” welfare states (Alber, 2006). Nevertheless, 
there is quite some empirical support for this argument about the social and political 
                                                 
1 It is interesting that the political metaphor “welfare queen” does not exist in the Scandinavian languages.   
 consequences of different welfare state models. This concerns not least the situation of 
children that grow up in low-resource single parent families (Rainwater and Smeeding, 2003).  
This chapter is organized as follows: The first section deals with the puzzle why the countries 
that have the most ambitious and encompassing social policies also seem to have the largest 
stock of social capital. The second section deals with the problem of causality – if the level of 
social capital can be seen as a causal factor behind variation in welfare state ambitions, or if 
the causality works the other way around. In this section is also a presentation of the relation 
between types of welfare state programs and economic redistribution. The last section 
presents a theory of how the causal mechanism(s) between social capital and welfare state 
policies can be understood.  
 
 
Social Capital and the Nordic puzzle 
 
What has become particularly interesting from a social capital perspective is that the countries 
that most resemble the ideal-type universal welfare state model are also the countries that are 
richest in social capital. Although, as should be obvious from this volume, there are a great 
number of ways to conceptualize and measure social capital, there is by now overwhelming 
support for this claim. Both attitudinal measures about social trust and behavioral measures 
about social activities in formal organizations and informal networks give supports that the 
Nordic countries are the richest in social capital (Uslaner, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2005; 
Kääriäinen and Lehtonen, 2006; Bjørnskov, 2007; Job, 2007). For example, people in the 
Nordic countries are much more likely than people in other countries to believe that “most 
other people can be trusted” (You, 2006). According to the 1995-97 World Value Study 
survey, the average stating that they believe that “most people can be trusted” is 64 percent 
for the Nordic countries which is almost three times as high as the world average.  People in 
the Nordic countries are also members and active in voluntary associations to a comparatively 
large extent (Vogel et al., 2003; van Oorschot et al., 2006). Moreover, for the Nordic 
countries there are no traces of the decline of social capital that has been reported for the 
United States (Larsen, 2007) 
The high level of social capital in the Nordic countries can be seen as puzzling for 
several reasons. One is that not least in political and policy circles, social capital in the form 
of social networks and voluntary associations or, with another term, civil society 
 organizations, has been seen as an alternative to the state (and the market and the family) for 
“getting things done”. Voluntary organizations come in many forms, from sport clubs and 
cultural organizations to religious communities and mutual self-help organizations, to name a 
few. What they all have in common is that they represent an alternative form of organizational 
logic. It is not authority (or money or kinship) that is driving civil society but cooperation for 
mutual interests, and such organizations cannot thrive without trust between members and 
confidence between the rank-and-file and the leaders of these organizations. One could 
therefore expect that we should see a “crowding out” effect such that the huge expansion of 
the responsibility of the government that the universal welfare state represents should be 
detrimental to the development of a vibrant civil society (Ostrom, 2000).  Moreover, one 
could argue that in a society were the government takes on the responsibility for a large 
number of social needs, people do not have to develop and maintain trusting relations and 
invest in social network (Wolfe, 1989; Scheepers et al., 2002). However, as stated above, the 
empirical reality contradicts these expectations. Studies show that social trust is highest in the 
Nordic countries and that citizens in these countries are among the most active in voluntary 
associations (van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). Thus, the relation between social capital and the 
Nordic type of universal welfare state presents us with a real puzzle. 
 
 
Is social capital the cause or the effect of the universal welfare state? 
 
There can be at least three general explanations for why high levels of social capital and “big 
government” in the form of universal welfare systems go together. First, both the 
development and level of social capital in a country may be unrelated to its system of welfare 
and social policies. This argument would rest on an idea that the social, political and 
economic trajectories of social capital and the welfare state can live “separate lives”. I 
consider this is a very unlikely scenario for a number of reasons. First, welfare states are 
about (different forms of) equality which has been shown to be important for the development 
of social trust (Uslaner, 2002; Dinesen, 2006; You, 2006). Secondly, the Nordic type of 
welfare states have historically been closely related to important nation-wide social 
movements such as the temperance movement, the labour movement, the farmers movement 
and the free churches to name a few. Historically, there is a direct link between civil society 
 organizations and the welfare state in these countries going back to the late 19th century 
(Rothstein, 2002; Torpe, 2003; Wollebæck and Selle, 2003).  
Thirdly, as will be shown below, citizens’ perceptions of “fairness” by government 
agencies have an impact on social trust and universal social policies contribute to this 
(Štulhofer, 2004; Kim, 2005; Uslaner, 2008). Finaaly, the three Scandinavian countries 
became internationally known for their consensual and collaborative forms of politics that 
were established during the economic crises of the 1930s, not least when it comes to 
arranging cooperative patterns of interaction between the major interest organizations and the 
state around the development of the welfare state.    
     The second general explanation for the puzzle is that a high level of social capital was 
necessary for the creation of the universal type of welfare state. In other words, the Nordic 
countries could build their encompassing system of social policies from the 1930s and 
onwards because they were already by then rich in social capital (Rothstein, 2005). In this 
scenario, the universal welfare state is to at least some extent caused by a high level of social 
capital. A country with a high level of social trust and an active voluntary sector is more 
likely to produce the kind of policies that are typical of the universal welfare states This line 
of reasoning is of course difficult to evaluate since we lack most of the necessary type of data 
from this period. We have no surveys or systematic comparative studies of the voluntary 
sector from this period. However, there are patches of data and “stories” than can be used to 
shed light on this theory and as I will show below, it can to some extent be substantiated 
(Trägårdh, 2007). 
      The third general explanation would be that the universal welfare state as such is a source 
of social capital (Kumlin, 2004).  This would imply that either the outcome of what this type 
welfare state produces enhances generalized trust and make it more likely that people will be 
engaged in voluntary associations and/or develop rich informal social networks. Or it could be 
something in “how it is done” that increases social capital. This latter argument implies that it 
is not the outcome of the various policies but the specific process of implementation in the 
universal welfare state that is important for creating social capital.    
       
  
The universal welfare state as a redistributive machine 
 
The universal welfare state is not only larger in terms of spending than other welfare states, 
but it is also more redistributive. This is somewhat counterintuitive since one would think that 
a selective welfare state that “taxes the rich and gives to the poor” would accomplish more 
redistribution than a universal welfare program that in principle gives the same benefits and 
services to all groups regardless of their income. However, empirical research gives a clear 
answer that the Nordic welfare states accomplishes more redistribution than other welfare 
states (Smeeding, 2005). The reason for this is that taxes are usually proportional on a 
percentage base (or progressive), while benefits and services are nominal.   The net effect of 
this is a considerable redistribution from the rich to the poor, while on average the middle 
strata breaks even in this system. In fact, before taxes and transfers are taken into account, the 
Nordic type of economy produces as much economic inequality as the U.S. economy. The 
“pure (labour-) market logic” in the Nordic countries is thus not particularly prone to equality. 
The reason why a selective welfare state produces less redistribution seem to be that if the 
middle class perceives that benefits and services are only going to “other people”, they will 
not accept a high level of taxation (Rothstein, 2001). It also seem to be the case that services 
for the poor tend to become “poor services”, while if the middle and upper classes are 
included, they will demand high quality in, for  example, health care, schools and care for the 
elderly.   
 
 
The universal welfare state as an outcome of social capital 
 
There are several reasons for why one could consider the universal welfare state as an effect 
of high levels of social capital. First, since the universal welfare state demands a high level of 
taxation, citizens must have a reasonable amount of trust that other citizens are willing to pay 
what they are supposed to. This can of course be accomplished by a draconic type of tax 
administration, but most research in this field show that brute force will not be enough. Some 
kind of quasi-voluntary compliance seem to be need for securing that the state can collect 
enough taxes and one ingredient in this seem to be that the individual citizen come to trust 
that most other citizens are taking on their share of the tax burden (Levi, 1998; Scholz, 1998). 
 Without this initial trust in “other people”, one could argue that it had not been possible to 
finance universal social policies.  
  A second argument is that at the time of the foundation of the universal welfare 
policies (mostly from the 1930s and onward), these were countries with hardly any ethnic or 
religious cleavages (although Finland still has a sizeable Swedish-speaking minority). 
Mistrust between different ethnic groups did not exist and it is reasonable to think that this 
would have been favourable for the existence of social trust.  
 Thirdly, although good comparative data is lacking, most historical research 
about the history of the Nordic countries underlines the importance of the so-called popular 
movements that arouse during the latter part of the 19th century. An important historical 
research project about the Swedish nineteenth century labelled this period as the “age of the 
associations.” (Pettersson, 1995). Among these associations, the labour movement, the 
farmers’ movement, the temperance movement and the free churches, played a very special 
and important role. The popular mass movements saw themselves as protest movements 
against the bureaucratic, clerical, aristocratic and capitalist elite who dominated Scandinavia 
at the turn of the last century. The idea of a “movement” implied that society should be 
changed and that the vehicle was mass organization from below. As organizations of both 
protest and self-help, the popular mass movements stood in sharp contrast to the charity 
organizations dominated by the middle- and upper classes. In the official mythology, the 
popular mass movements were the major schools of democratic and organizational training, 
making the transition to democracy a relatively civilized affair in these countries (Lundström 
and Wijkström, 1997). 
 The major social conflict during this period in the Nordic countries was of 
course the tension between the labour movement and the capitalist class. However, what 
seems to be unique about the Nordic countries (with the notable exception of Finland) is the 
development of a very close collaboration between the state and the popular mass movements 
without destroying the autonomy of the latter (Klaussen and Selle, 1996).  To illustrate the 
historical pattern, I will focus on one aspect of the relationship between the state and the 
labour movement in Sweden. An especially interesting case was the establishment of the 
National Board for Social Affairs in 1912. According to the commission that prepared the bill, 
the task of this agency was not primarily poor-relief, a function handled by local authorities, 
but instead was nothing less than the so-called labour question.  The commission argued that 
the problem was concentrated in the cities, where the rapid process of industrialization had led 
 to a potentially dangerous situation with masses of workers who had become alienated from 
traditional local communities and other social bonds. In the words of the commission: 
 
The feeling of solidarity that has emerged among the working 
masses, in itself praiseworthy, is limited to themselves and they do 
not appear to wish to extend it to the whole society in which they 
share responsibility and play a part. This obviously poses a national 
danger, which must be removed in the common interest of everyone. 
Everywhere the government therefore faces the difficult task of 
mitigating conflicts of interest and repairing the cracks that are 
opening in the social structure (cited in Rothstein, 1992, p. 162).  
 
The National Board for Social Affairs was established to handle this problem by 
implementing reforms in worker safety, labor exchanges and social housing and by 
overseeing the poor-relief system managed by the local authorities.  Its mandate was to handle 
the labor question, and the preferred method was to incorporate representatives from this new 
and threatening social class into the state machinery.  As a result of the commission’s 
proposal, the chairmen of the national trade union conference (the LO) and of the employers’ 
federation (the SAF) were given seats on the board of the agency and, following the 
corporatist principle, other representatives from the LO and the SAF were given seats on 
various sub-committees.  The commission’s argument supporting this arrangement was that 
the representatives from the organizations 
 
would behave as guardians not only of special interests but also of 
the interests of everyone, of society as a whole . . . It should 
certainly be expected that a representative body structured 
according to these principles, official and thus functioning with a 
sense of responsibility, should provide valuable support for the new 
social welfare administration (cited in Rothstein, 1992, p. 164). 
 
Another illustration of this type of state-organized collaboration between the opposing 
interests can be found for the public employment exchanges. In many contintental countries, 
this issue was hotly disputed because the party that controlled the employment exchanges had 
 a very important influence in the many local industrial conflicts that were very common 
during this period. However, in Sweden, the local public employment exchanges were to be 
governing by a so-called parity principle which meant that half the representatives on the 
board were taken from the local unions and the other half from the major employers (and the 
board was to be chaired by an impartial local civil servant).  In a report from 1916 to the 
government regarding the operation of the local employment exchanges, the National Board 
for Social Affairs declared that “no objection has appeared from any quarter against the 
organizational principles on which the publicly operated employment exchanges were based”. 
On the contrary, the board argued that it was these very principles that had made it possible 
for the system to grow and that had been pivotal for strengthening the confidence their 
operations enjoyed among both employer organizations and unions, “which in our country 
have fortunately abstained from utilizing the employment service as a weapon in the social 
struggle, which in Germany has partially distorted the whole issue of labor exchanges.” The 
Board also observed that 
 
Despite the sharp social and political conflicts that have emerged in 
other areas of public life between members of the employer and worker 
camps, on the boards of the labor exchanges the same persons have, in 
the experience of the National Board for Social Affairs, continued to 
cooperate faithfully in the interest of objectivity (cited in Rothstein, 
1992, p. 165). 
 
This type of corporatist relations spread quickly to other areas of the Swedish state and came 
to dominate the political culture of the Swedish model. It should also be noted that in 
Sweden, this pattern of interest accommodation was established before parliamentary 
democracy was enacted. Almost all areas of political intervention in the labour market (for 
example, workers pensions, accident compensation and the implementation of the eight-hour 
working day) were to be governed according to the collaborative principles.  Moreover, in 
addition to how the labour movement was organized into the state, many other voluntary 
organizations were also incorporated into this pattern of governance. For example, the 
temperance movement was given the responsibility of handling the government’s propaganda 
against widespread misuse of alcohol; the farmers’ movement, the responsibility of handling 
subsidies to farming; small business organizations, the responsibility of implementing 
 subsidies to support small business; and so on. A qualitative breakthrough came during the 
Second World War when nearly all parts of the wartime administrations incorporated the 
major interest organizations of each policy area. The argument that was put forward 
repeatedly was that this would create trust among the members and followers of the 
organizations for the process of implementing the policy in question (Rothstein, 1992).  
 This pattern of close collaboration between the state and the major 
organizations on the labour market can of course be seen as a contrast to other European 
countries were these relations ended in bloody conflicts, civil wars and ruthless dictatorships. 
However, it is noteworthy that in, for example, the Spanish case, recent historical analyses 
have argued that at late as 1931, the Spanish socialist party “had collaborated with the 
government, taking a position that put them to the right even of the French Socialists at that 
time and brought them close to the …. Scandinavian Social Democrats.”  It was a only few 
years later (in 1933-34) that the Spanish socialist party declared that it was going for “a full 
scale civil war” and put forward paroles such as “Harmony? No! Class War! Hatred of the 
criminal bourgeoisie to the death!” (Payne, 2004, p. 31).  
  Why the class conflicts in the Scandinavian countries followed a collaborative 
and peaceful path is of course open to debate, but it is not unreasonable to point at the 
establishment of the neo-corporatist structures as described above (Rothstein, 2005). It should 
be noted that the Nordic countries were not always a peaceful part of the world characterized 
by collaboration and negotiations. Going back in history, Denmark and Sweden were arch-
enemies and fought ten bloody wars between 1471 and 1814. Norway was under Danish rule 
until 1814 and then under Swedish rule until 1905. Finland had a terrible civil war in 1918 
(including the use of concentration camps and organized killings of innocent civilians) and 
quite some social unrest in the 1930s. What was special with the Scandinavian countries is 
that the system of neo-corporatism that was established early in the 20th century proved to be 
a successful way to build trustful relations between the opposing factions in society which in 
its turn paved the way for the establishment of the universal welfare state.     
  
The universal welfare state as a producer of social capital 
 
The other possible explanation for the “Nordic puzzle” may be that a universal welfare state 
creates social trust and social capital. One such reason may have to do with outcomes. Several 
recent studies show that economic inequality is detrimental to the development of social 
capital (Uslaner, 2002; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen, 2006; You, 2006). The logic for this would 
be that in societies with high levels of economic inequality and with few (or inefficient) 
policies in place for increasing equality of opportunity, there is less concern for people of 
different backgrounds.  The rich and the poor in a country with a highly unequal distribution 
of wealth, such as Brazil, may live next to each other, but their lives do not intersect. Their 
children attend different schools, they use different health care services. and in many cases, 
the poor can not afford either of these services. The rich are protected by both the police and 
private guards, while the poor see these as their natural enemies. In such societies, neither the 
rich nor the poor have a sense of shared fate with the other. Instead they are likely to fear 
and/or despise each other (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; Larsen, 2007).  
One special feature of the universal welfare state is that the very universality of social 
services and benefits (including education) may increase not only economic equality but also 
the sense of equality of opportunity. Since optimism for the future is one key determinant of 
social trust, this makes less sense when there is more economic inequality. Moreover, the less 
fortunate have fewer reasons to be optimistic about their (or their children’s) future if they 
sense that society is not giving them equality of opportunity.  People at the bottom of the 
income distribution, or minorities that feel discriminated against will be less sanguine that 
they too share in society’s bounty (Uslaner, 2002).   
 Second, the distribution of resources and opportunities plays a key role in establishing 
the belief that people share a common destiny and have similar fundamental values.  When 
resources and opportunities are distributed more equally, people are more likely to perceive a 
common stake with others and to see themselves as part of a larger social order.  If there is a 
strong skew in wealth or in the possibilities to improve onse stake in life, people at each end 
may feel that they have little in common with others. In highly unequal societies, people are 
likely to stick with their own kind.  Perceptions of injustice will reinforce negative stereotypes 
of other groups, making social trust and accommodation more difficult. 
 The importance of economic equality from the literature on social capital was until 
recently not on the agenda which, given what the data show, is something of a mystery. For 
example, while Robert Putnam points at the importance of economic inequality in his analysis 
of the decline of social capital in the United States, it is not mentioned in his conclusion about 
“what killed civic engagement?” Moreover, among the seven policy prescriptions for 
increasing social capital in the U.S. that he presents, none touches upon increasing any form 
of equality (Putnam, 2000, 359ff and ch. 15 and 22). This is all the more surprising since the 
decline of social capital that Putnam finds in the United States since the 1970s seems to be 
suspiciously related in time to a dramatic increase in economic inequality (Neckerman, 2004).  
The same strange omission can be seen in the Russell Sage Foundation’s large project 
on trust: Among the 51 chapters in the four edited volumes, none is about economic 
inequality and none of the volumes has an index entry on equality or inequality.(Hardin, 
1998; Ostrom and Walker, 2003; Hardin, 2004; Cook et al., 2005) The same goes for the 
three monographs that this project has produced(Hardin, 2002; Huo and Tyler, 2002; Cook et 
al., 2005). While political scientists and sociologists largely have neglected the importance of 
equality for creating social trust, economists have been more interested.  Stephen  Knack and  
Paul Zak at the World Bank have concluded that redistribution is one important policy option 
for governments to increase social trust. However, in a way that seems mandatory for 
economists, they add that they worry about the economic inefficiencies that they believe can 
be caused by such redistribution (Knack and Zak, 2002). 
The second major reason for why a universal welfare state may generate social trust has 
to do with procedural fairness. The problem with means-testing from the perspective of 
procedural justice is that it places great demands both on public employees and on citizens 
seeking assistance. The public employee must actively interpret a general body of regulations 
and apply them to each individual seeking to qualify for a public service. The difficulty is that 
the regulations are seldom so exact that they provide completely unambiguous direction as to 
what is the right decision in an individual case. As Michael Lipsky shows in Street-Level 
Bureaucracy, “grassroots bureaucrats” must develop their own practice in interpreting the 
regulations in order to deal with this difficulty. This interpretive practice is frequently 
informal and less explicit in nature and, consequently, the bureaucracies applying the needs 
tests are easily suspected of using “prejudice, stereotype, and ignorance as a basis for 
determination” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 69). In other words, a program based on needs-testing 
implies a great scope for bureaucratic discretion. The citizen, for her part, has an incentive 
and opportunity in this situation to withhold relevant information from the bureaucrat and to 
 try in various ways to convince the latter that she should qualify for the service in question. 
This easily escalates into a vicious spiral of distrust from the client, leading to increasing 
control from the bureaucrat (who, moreover, is equipped with a large amount of discretion) 
that in its turn results in still more distrust from the client, and so on.  
Because of these complex and controversial decision-making processes, needs testing 
and bureaucratic discretionary power are often more difficult to reconcile with principles of 
procedural justice, compared with universal public services. Since selective welfare 
institutions must test each case individually, they are to a greater extent subject to the 
suspicion of cheating, arbitrariness and discrimination, compared with universal public 
agencies (Rothstein, 1998). 
Another problem is that selective welfare programs often stigmatize recipients as 
“welfare clients”.  They demarcate the rich and the poor and those at the bottom are made to 
feel that they are less worthy, not least because of the bureaucratic intrusion felt in the process 
of implementation. Universal programs are connected to citizens’ rights, while selective 
welfare programs have trouble with legitimacy because they have to single out the 
“deserving” from the “non-deserving poor”. This will always imply discretionary decisions by 
street-level bureaucrats who may intrude on the personal integrity of clients (Soss, 2000).  
Denigrating recipients of means-tested government programs leads to social strains in two 
ways: The poor feel isolated and feel that others deem them unworthy.  The denigration of 
welfare recipients feeds on public perceptions that the poor truly are responsible for their own 
poverty.  Neither side sees a shared fate with the other.  In contrast, universal programs do not 
cast aspersions on the responsibility of benefits and thus do not destroy trust.  When they 
work well, they can even help to create trust by increasing feelings of equal treatment and 
equality of opportunity (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Historical macro-level explanations in the social sciences are difficult things. There are good 
arguments both for the idea that the Nordic type welfare state is an effect of a initially high 
level of social capital or that it is cause for the high level of social capital. To solve this 
question is in all likelihood a “hard case” (Stolle, 2003).  However, one could think that it is a 
combination of both approaches that explains the high level of social capital in the Nordic 
 welfare states. Following this line of reasoning, sequencing and so called “feed-back” 
mechanism between the variables set societies onto different (vicious or virtuous) circles that 
can be understood as paths from which it is difficult to deviate. One could think of this 
development in the following way: Initially the Nordic societies had a stock of social capital 
that was not much higher than in other comparable countries, but it was high enough to create 
a small set of universal policies which in its turn increased the level of social capital so that in 
the next sequence it was possible to enact new or broaden the existing universal social 
policies, that served to further increase the level of social trust, and so on. However, it can 
also be the case that this path did not start out with an initially “more than average” level of 
social capital but with a “top-down” construction of some kind of universal social insurance 
policy that started this process.  In any case, the explanation for why these societies are 
nowadays rich in social capital would be that at some “formative moment” or “critical 
juncture” they managed to set in motion a process in which universal social policy institutions 
and social capital became mutually reinforcing entities.    
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